Indonesia).4 Aceh's so-called Darul Islam rebellion, nominally led by Teungku Daud
Beureueh, was finally brought to an end in 1962 after years of complex negotiations, and low-level fighting, between Acehnese and central government authorities. While the rebellion failed to achieve its original goal of establishing an Islamic state in Aceh, it did win the province recognition as a Daerah Istimewa (Special Region) with nominal autonomy in the realms of religion, culture, and education.5 The resolution of the Darul Islam rebellion through negotiation, and with minimal loss of life, was eased significantly by the fact that, notwithstanding their dissatisfaction with the central government in Jakarta, the rebel leaders never sought to separate from Indonesia. They had joined the movement for Negara Islam Indonesia because they were opposed to the centralizing tendencies of the regime, and to what they saw as its softness toward the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), but there was never any serious doubt about their loyalty to a united Indonesia. Nevertheless, the movement resurfaced in early 1989 launching a series of armed attacks on local military and police posts. Government authorities initially dismissed the attacks as the work of a minor criminal band with only a few weapons and little popular support. By mid-1990, however, it appeared that the rebels had gained the sympathy of a fairly wide cross-section of the population, especially in Pidie, Aceh Utara, and Aceh Timur. Moreover, civilians were now among the targets of the group's assaults, and government sources estimated that it had mobilized roughly two hundred armed fighters, some of whom were said to have received military training in Libya.10 After an apparently unsuccessful territorial operation against the movement, in mid-1990 the Regional Military Commander was replaced and some six thousand additional troops were deployed to the region, bringing the total to about twelve thousand.11 By late 1991 it appeared that government troops had largely succeeded in crushing the rebellion, and in killing most of its top leaders, but Aceh Merdeka supporters continued to menace Indonesian forces thereafter. One measure of the uncertainty of the central government's victory was that the military's Operasi Jaring Merah (Operation Red Net) remained in effect, and Aceh continued to be designated a Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM, Military Operations Area) until 1998.12
The sudden resumption of serious political violence in late 1998, just a few months after the withdrawal of most combat troops, was a further reminder of that uncertainty. On December 20, a crowd of about one thousand attacked a police post in Bayu, Aceh Utara, after hearing rumors that a police sergeant had sexually harassed a married woman. In the ensuing fracas, the officer in question narrowly escaped with his life, several government buildings were destroyed, an army officer and his wife were badly beaten, two marines were kidnapped, and at least two civilians suffered serious injury. Just over a week later, on December 29, a crowd in Lhok Nibung, Aceh Timur, beat to death several soldiers whom they had dragged from a passing bus. On January 3, 1999 a military operation called Operasi Wibawa 99, ostensibly aimed at capturing those responsible for the killings, and restoring government authority, resulted in scores of arrests and the killing of at least eleven people in the vicinity of Lhokseumawe. Although there was doubt about who had led the assaults against military and police personnel, government authorities were quick to blame Aceh Merdeka, claiming that some of the group's leaders had returned from exile in Malaysia to resume their campaign for independence. Based on that interpretation, military authorities deployed several hundred combat troops in the area, and began what many feared would be another major counter-insurgency campaign.13
The Limits of Tradition So legendary is Aceh's reputation for rebelliousness and Islamic militancy, that it is tempting to view the recent Aceh Merdeka uprisings as new manifestations of an Acehnese tradition or, as some would have it, an expression of a primordial Acehnese urge to independence. There is an element of truth in these views, as the patterns of historical continuity among the different rebellions attest. The geographical base area of Acehnese resistance, for example, has remained more or less constant over the past one hundred years or so. The center of all three uprisings has been in the north-eastern coastal areas of Pidie, Aceh Utara, and Aceh Timur. There has also been a measure of continuity in the social composition of the leadership of rebellion. Aceh Merdeka leader, Teungku Hasan di Tiro, for instance, is the grandson of a hero of the Aceh War, Teungku Cik di Tiro, and was an associate of Darul Islam leader, Teungku Daud Beureueh.14 These historical and personal links have given Aceh Merdeka an almost automatic credibility and meaning that is difficult to distinguish from the idea of "tradition." The experience and memory of previous rebellions has also helped to consolidate a myth about Aceh-as a unique center of Islamic tradition, as a region with a glorious history of independence and resistance to outside authority, and so on-that has instilled in both leaders and followers a sense of belonging to a political community, and has given resonance to calls for Acehnese liberation and national independence. These elements of historical continuity and shared memory are an important part of the Aceh Merdeka story. Indeed, it is fair to say that without them, it would be difficult to account for the rise and popularity of the movement in the 1970s and 1980s. One might even argue that in the absence of the presumed "tradition" of Acehnese resistance, New Order authorities would have paid far less attention to the movement. Nevertheless, the description of the recent troubles in Aceh as a mere extension of a tradition of resistance and Islamic militancy arguably obscures as much as it reveals. It obscures, first, significant differences in the aims of the different rebellions. Whereas the Darul Islam rebellion and the Aceh War aimed sincerely to promote and protect Islamic law and culture, Aceh Merdeka focused squarely on demands for political and 13 Human Rights Watch, "International Effort Needed on Aceh," January 4,1999; Amnesty International, "Renewed Violence Plunges Aceh Back into Terror," January 11, 1999; Meunasah, December 23, 1998, December 30, 1998, and January 5, 1999; Serambi Indonesia, December 22, 1998; and New York Times, January 5, 1999. 14 Hasan di Tiro, who was working for the Indonesian government at the United Nations in New York when the rebellion broke out in 1953, resigned from his post and designated himself Darul Islam's "ambassador" to the United Nations. Sjamsuddin, "Issues and politics of regionalism," p. 115. economic independence, with religious concerns mentioned only in passing.15 This explicit demand for independence was arguably not so much an extension of Acehnese tradition as a conscious emulation-despite the very different historical and legal circumstances-of the impressive independence movement that had emerged only a few years before in East Timor. Living outside of Indonesia, and circulating in the eddies and backwaters of the international diplomatic scene, Aceh Merdeka leader Hasan di Tiro was apparently inspired by, and perhaps envious of, the power and political appeal of the East Timorese resistance, and sought for a time to coax its spokesman, Jos6 Ramos-Horta, into an alliance. Though that initiative was rebuffed, di Tiro did his best to imitate the East Timorese resistance, in rhetoric and in method. The explicit demand for independence and the bellicose language and tactics he employed, were seen as a clear provocation by the New Order and triggered a predictably harsh response.
The focus on tradition and continuity also obscures important differences in the social composition of the leaderships of the different rebellions. Whereas the earlier uprisings were led, or very strongly supported by, Aceh's ulama, the leadership of Aceh Merdeka has been drawn predominantly from a collection of intellectuals, local government officials, disgruntled members of the armed forces, and local businessmen. Although he uses the title "Teungku," reserved for respected men of Islam, Hasan di Tiro cannot by any reasonable measure be described as a religious leader. Indeed, as those who have met him or read his political tracts generally concur, he is far closer, sociologically and politically, to the Acehnese aristocratic uleebalang class than to the ulama who led the earlier rebellions. He has, moreover, spent much of the past fifty years living abroad, first in the United States and then in Sweden, and in a fashion that one would not readily associate with the life of an Islamic scholar. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that very few ulama have given the movement their wholehearted support and some, including former supporters of Darul Islam, have been openly opposed to it.16 Finally, the focus on tradition and continuity obscures the long periods during which Aceh has been either super-loyal to the central Indonesian government, as it was from 1945 to 1949, or politically calm and orderly, as it was through most of the 1960s and 1970s, and even much of the 1980s. These periods of calm and order make a nonsense of the idea that Aceh has been driven to rebellion by "natural" or "primordial" urges.
Taken together, these considerations suggest that the recent Aceh Merdeka uprisings, and the extreme violence that followed from them, cannot properly be understood solely as the continuation of a tradition. Indeed, the differences between the aims and the leadership of Aceh Merdeka and the earlier rebellions, and the onagain off-again pattern of political trouble in Aceh, both suggest that the rise of Aceh Merdeka and the extreme violence after 1989 were related to changes in the broader economic and political environment-an environment which changed quite dramatically during these years.
The Political Economy of Violence
Aceh's historical resistance to outside authorities has always been rooted, to some degree, in conflicts over the control and distribution of economic resources. Its conflict with the Dutch in the nineteenth century, and earlier with the Portuguese and with neighboring Southeast Asian states, were not only struggles between competing worldviews but also contests for the control of trade. Similarly, the leaders of the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s, while sincere in their pursuit of Islamic ideals, were partly driven by a desire to maintain the considerable autonomy, in economic and other spheres, they had come to enjoy in the late 1940s. Moreover, their resentment toward the central government was deepened by a feeling that the substantial economic contributions they had made to the Republic of Indonesia during the National Revolution had not been properly appreciated or recognized.17
Economic issues were also important in stimulating the New Order conflict between Aceh and Jakarta starting in the mid-1970s. In part, this was because Aceh happened to be extremely rich in natural resources-including oil, natural gas, timber, and a variety of valuable minerals-which began to be exploited to an unprecedented degree during this period. Perhaps even more significant was the manner in which New Order authorities set about exploiting those resources and distributing the benefits. One distinctive feature of that approach-and one of the reasons that massive exploitation of resources took place at all-was the very close relationship that the regime developed with foreign capital. That relationship was based partly on an ideological predisposition within the leadership group, but increasingly on the enormous material benefits that it brought both to the state and to individual officials, in the form of kick-backs, rents, fees, bribes, and so on. A second critical feature of the regime's approach was the highly centralized nature of its procedures for economic decision-making.18
The close nexus between state and capital, and the extreme centralization of economic decision-making, brought untold benefits to the New Order and to foreign capitalists operating in Aceh from the mid-1970s on. Simultaneously, however, it set in motion a variety of changes that generated popular support for Aceh Merdeka and contributed to the problem of unrest and violence. while the absolute level of poverty in the province was said to be relatively low by national standards, in the mid-1980s it was still the case that fewer than 10 percent of villages in energy-rich Aceh had a steady supply of electricity.26 Unsurprisingly, the boom also brought a number of undesirable side-effects, including the expropriation of land from small farmers without adequate compensation,27 the failure to provide adequate social amenities and infrastructure for displaced communities and migrant workers,28 and serious environmental degradation in the vicinity of the plants.29 These problems were compounded by the sometimes extreme insensitivity of Indonesian government and military authorities toward local people, who were commonly described as "fanatics," whose culture and worldview were in need of modernization and improvement.30 In return, some Acehnese blamed "outsiders" for encouraging practices they found offensive to Islam and to local custom, such as gambling, drinking, and prostitution.
Worse still, the substantial revenues generated by taxes and royalties were channeled directly to the central government, and there was a perception that very little was recycled back to the province in the form of government investment or subsidies. Of course Aceh was not alone in this regard, and it was hardly the worst off among Indonesia's provinces.31 Nevertheless, the fact that Aceh was contributing so much to national revenues and exports helped to create a feeling of resentment that it was not getting a great deal more in return.32 The skimming of tax and other revenues by the center was especially irritating to Acehnese intellectuals and local government technocrats, who felt that far more of the locally generated revenues ought to have been spent locally33 33 A number of authors have described the rise of a class of technocrats in New Order Aceh, but the political role of this group remains ambiguous. While on the one hand they have been described as tools of the New Order state, it is clear that they gave expression to many of the grievances over Aceh's unfair treatment by Jakarta. Kell writes, for example, that ". .. for the technocrats, Aceh's difficulty was that it Members of Aceh's small but growing business class were unhappy for slightly different reasons. Though some benefited from the injection of private foreign investment in the region, many felt aggrieved because outsiders, particularly those with good political connections in Jakarta, or with the military in Aceh, appeared to be winning more than their share of lucrative contracts. Among the disgruntled businessmen was none other than Aceh Merdeka leader, Hasan di Tiro, whose bid for building a pipeline for Mobile Oil was reportedly beaten out by a US firm in 1974.34 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, members of all these groups-intellectuals, technocrats, and businessmen-were among the strongest supporters of Aceh Merdeka. execution of an Aceh Merdeka suspect, it was later reported that the dead man had been detained in connection with a private dispute he had had with a local government official in Pidie. The official had evidently hired the Kopassus soldiers to "resolve" the dispute.39
Although evidence for the existence of such a military mafia remains largely anecdotal, its existence would be in keeping with patterns in other parts of the country, and in particular in other areas of long-term military operations. It would also help to account for the extraordinary reluctance of the armed forces to leave Aceh, and to end the military operation there long after Aceh Merdeka appeared to have been crushed as a military force.
The Logic of Rebellion
The conjuncture of these trends-the growing importance of Aceh's economy for the central government, the failure of the LNG boom to provide the kinds of benefits anticipated by ordinary people, the problem of military heavy-handedness, and the emergence of a military-linked mafia-led inevitably to growing tensions between Acehnese on the one hand and central government and military officials on the other. Because these trends affected a fairly broad spectrum of Acehnese society, including farmers, fishermen, laborers, unemployed migrant workers-as well as the small Acehnese political, technocratic, and economic elite-they had the effect of increasing the credibility, and broadening the appeal, of the demands made by Aceh Merdeka's leaders.
The timing of Aceh Merdeka's rise, the targets of its attacks, and its geographical focus, lend additional support to the view that the movement was stimulated by the tensions generated by New Order economic policy. This is not to say that Aceh Merdeka emerged directly in response to the LNG boom in the 1970s, but rather that the changes set in motion by the state-capital link, and the extreme centralization of economic decision-making, stimulated a consciousness of shared fate that reinforced existing ideas of Acehnese identity and increased the credibility of Aceh Merdeka in the area. The fact that the main LNG and oil facilities were located in the former base areas of the Darul Islam rebellion and the Aceh War, as well as on the home turf of Hasan di Tiro, gave a special resonance to the calls for rebellion and independence in these areas. The significance of economic developments in generating the conflict in Aceh is highlighted by the t remarkable quietness of the province through most of the 1960s and early 1970s. The contrast can be explained, in part, by the fact that in those years Aceh ws of no great interest economically, and so was largely left alone by the center. With the start of LNG production in the mid-1970s, however, Aceh became a magnet for the greedy and the powerful, and therefore a site of economic and political contention.
Yet, while the rapid economic transformations of the 1970s and 1980s undoubtedly contributed to the rise of Aceh Merdeka, and to the heightened central government concern over stability in the area, they do not appear to account for the extreme levels of violence that engulfed the area from mid-1990 to 1993. Nor do they explain the sudden resurgence of political violence in late 1998. Part of the explanation lies in the behavior of Aceh Merdeka itself, because its ideology of explicit separatism, its bellicose anti-Javanese rhetoric, its strategy of armed resistance, and its attacks on vital industries and transmigrants have seemed designed to provoke the most hostile possible reaction from the Indonesian armed forces. Yet, when the story is told from the perspective of Acehnese who experienced these events first-hand, it becomes clear that the degree and nature of the violence in Aceh after 1990 was even more closely related to the behavior of Indonesia's armed forces. That is to say, the actions of the Indonesian military in Aceh need to be examined not simply as a response to a mature rebellion, whose "roots" lay somewhere in the socio-economic or primordial past, but as an integral part of the development of that rebellion, and of the condition of recurrent violence and instability which grew from it.
Military Doctrine and Practice
The use of military force to deal with armed insurgents was not, of course, an innovation of the New Order. Dutch colonial forces behaved with conspicuous brutality in Aceh, and in some other parts of the archipelago, as the Dutch sought to extend their administrative authority to previously autonomous areas in the late nineteenth century. Under President Sukarno, combat troops had been deployed throughout the country, including in Aceh, to put down rebellions and insurrections. The soldiers of the Old Order were, on occasion, accused of serious abuses, including torture and rape. Christie writes, for example, that in Aceh in the 1950s "the response of the government troops to rebel actions tended to be clumsy and brutal... [and] this had the inevitable effect of increasing sympathy and support for the rebels."43 What was new, and distinctive, about military doctrine and practice under the late New Order was: first, the institutionalization of terror as a method for dealing with perceived threats to national security; and second, the systematic and forced mobilization of civilians to serve as auxiliaries and spies in counter-insurgency operations.44 These features of New Order military doctrine and practice ensured that in Aceh a much broader spectrum of people came to experience the hard edge of the regime, to feel deep bitterness towards it, and to sympathize more completely with the opposition. These methods also encouraged greater violence and disruption in local society, and inflicted wounds that would prove exceptionally difficult to heal. Their thumbs, and sometimest their feet, had been tied together with a particular type of knot. Most had been shot at close range, though the bullets were seldom found in their bodies. Most also showed signs of having been beaten with a blunt instrument or tortured, and their faces were therefore often unrecognizable. For the most part, the bodies were not recovered by relatives or friends, both out of fear of retribution by the mitary and because the victims were usually dumped at some distance from their home villages.51
In technique and in evident purpose, ththese killings closely resembled the government-sponsored summary executions of alleged petty-criminals in the mid1980s. Known by the acronym Petrus, the earlier "mysterious killings" had left some five thousand people dead in Java and other parts of the country. Though government and military authorities had initially denied any involvement in the Petrus killings, it eventually emerged that they had been initiated by the regime itself and carried out by a specially trained sub-unit of Kopassus.52 It was also revealed that the use of terror had had a deliberate strategic intent. In his memoirs, published in 1989, Suharto provided the following rationale for the killings.
The peace was disturbed. It was as if there was no longer peace in this country. It was as though all there was was fear ... We had to apply some treatment, to take some stern action. Like the Petrus killings, the "mysterious killings" in Aceh were clearly part of a central government policy that involved the deliberate use of "shock therapy" to achieve a strategic security and political objective.54 There can be no other explanation for the many documented instances in which military authorities severed the heads of alleged rebels and placed them on stakes in front of their command posts, or in public markets. Nor is there any other way to explain why military officers forced passersby to witness the roadside executions of rebel suspects.55 Besides the testimony of witnesses, the evidence to support this claim comes from the statements of the military authorities involved. Commenting on the public display of corpses, for example, one military officer in Aceh admitted: "Okay, that does happen. But the rebels use terrorist strategies so we are forced to use anti-terrorist strategies."56 Asked whether the mysterious killings were intended as "shock therapy" the Regional Military Commander, Major General R. Pramono, said: "As a strategy, that's true. But our goal is not bad. Our goal must be correct... We only kill them if they are members [of Aceh Merdeka]."57 Many victims of summary execution were simply shot and thrown into mass graves, at least one of which reportedly contained as many as two hundred bodies. Commenting on reports of such a mass grave in late 1990, Major General R. Pramono told a journalist: "The grave certainly exists but I don't think it could have been two hundred bodies. It's hard to tell with arms and heads all mixed up."58 But if the method of disposal was different, the intent of the mass killings was the same: to sow terror, to create an atmosphere of fear, and to ensure that witnesses to such crimes remained silent. The strategy worked, at least in the short term. As a man who lived near the site of a mass grave commented in 1998: "At that time, trucks carrying bodies to be buried on the peninsula or just dumped on the streets came and went at night, while people were too scared to ask what happened."59 In the long term, however, the military's use of terror stimulated a profound anger among a broad cross-section of Aceh's population. That anger was fueled by the Habibie government's failure to take 54 Amnesty International concluded that: "The timing of the worst killings in Aceh, the methods and techniques employed, and the comments made by military officers in the region, suggest strongly that extrajudicial execution was part of a deliberate and coordinated counter-insurgency strategy. Moreover, the uniformity of the pattern of human rights violations reported in Aceh and those documented in other parts of Indonesia and East Timor, indicates that, where it faces serious opposition to its authority, political killing may be a central aspect of Indonesian Government policy." Amnesty International, Shock Therapy, p. 18. In the first few years of the operation alone, military authorities mobilized tens of thousands of men into such units.66 Recruits received basic military training and, after being armed with knives, spears, and machetes, were told to "hunt" Aceh Merdeka supporters. As they had done during the anti-communist campaign in 1965-1966, and during counter-insurgency operations in East Timor, military authorities also organized mass rallies in Aceh at which civilians were exhorted to "crush the GPK," and to swear an oath that they would "crush the terrorists until there is nothing left of them."67 The failure to participate in such campaigns-or to demonstrate a sufficient commitment to crushing the enemy by identifying, capturing, or killing alleged rebels-often resulted in punishment, and sometimes public torture and execution.68
The strategy of "civil-military cooperation" also entailed the recruitment of local people to serve as spies and informers for the military. One consequence of this arrangement was the reinforcement of an atmosphere of pervasive fear and silence. One simply did not know who might be listening. As an Acehnese human rights activist said in August 1998: "We have lived for years with fear. During the New Order, we kept our mouths shut, never daring to speak out ... because in every cafe and street corer there were intelligence agents listening."69
The strategy bred terrible tensions and conflicts among Acehnese. Perhaps with honorable intentions, many Acehnese of some social standing-including members of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, Indonesian Council of Ulamas)-joined the army's counter-insurgency campaign.70 Others, possibly fearing the repercussions of noncooperation, became enthusiastic spies and informants for the military. In doing so, they helped to send hundreds, perhaps thousands of fellow Acehnese to their graves. The wounds caused by such actions do not heal easily. Predictably perhaps, in the months after the withdrawal of combat troops in August 1998, Acehnese collaborators, known locally as cuak, were subjected to violent reprisals. At least two were beaten to death by angry crowds, while others were forced to seek protection with local authorities.71 Like the attacks on military and police personnel, the violence against collaborators seemed likely to continue for some time, another long-term legacy of New Order military strategy. Soon, high-ranking government authorities were rushing to express their concern and their outrage over past violations. Once this had begun, it was impossible to stop the criticism from spreading. Acehnese, and other Indonesians, began to call openly not for Aceh's independence, and certainly not for an Islamic state, but for thorough investigations into military abuses committed over the previous ten years, for the punishment of the soldiers and officers responsible, and for compensation of the victims. While this shift did not result in the immediate punishment of those responsible for the abuses, it did substantially alter the political balance on the issue. The armed forces were clearly on the defensive for the first time, and the prospects for a proper investigation, while not great, were arguably better than they ever had been. 
Context and

Models and opportunities
The authorities who plotted the New Order's response to the Aceh Merdeka rebellions were influenced by contemporaneous events, both within Indonesia and abroad, and by memories of recent successes and failures. The models of action available to them, that is, were framed and limited by the historical circumstances and the timing of the events in question.
We have noted, for example, how Aceh Merdeka's emulation of the resistance in East Timor in the late 1970s must have caused considerable alarm among the authorities in Jakarta, moving them to respond more forcefully than they might otherwise have done. At the same time, the fact that the regime was then in the midst of a major military campaign in East Timor meant that it could not afford to launch a full-scale counter-insurgency operation in Aceh as well. Moreover many of the most brutal tactics and methods that would later be employed in Aceh had not yet been fully developed or perfected when Aceh Merdeka launched its first rebellion in the late 1970s. By the time of the second uprising in 1989, the regime's counter-insurgency repertoire had expanded considerably. Techniques like the "mysterious killings" and the "fence of legs" had by then been tried and proven in the field and were available for "export" to Aceh and other trouble spots. The availability of those techniques meant that a type of systematic terror was possible in the early 1990s that would have been difficult to envision in the late 1970s.
The timing of the government response to the second Aceh Merdeka uprising was significant in other ways as well. It should be recalled that the crackdown in Aceh began more than a year before the November 1991 massacre at Santa Cruz, East Timor, and the unprecedented criticism at home and abroad that stemmed from it. That criticism would eventually send shock waves through the regime and the armed forces, but in the years and months before the Santa Cruz massacre the regime's leading figures displayed a remarkable confidence about the success of their terrorist methods. It may be recalled that 1989 was the year East Timor was "opened up" to tourists and journalists for the first time in fifteen years. It was also the year President Suharto published the autobiography in which he took credit for, and gloated over the success of, the Petrus killings of the mid-1980s. This was a time, too, when international criticism of the New Order's human rights record had reached a low ebb. Stimulated by a desire to capitalize on the then burgeoning economies of the region, Western governments were reluctant to voice concern about, or to take concrete measures in opposition to, the violations committed by Indonesian government forces. In these years Western governments routinely argued that the human rights situation in East Timor was improving, and that it was pointless and irresponsible to question the territory's political status. There was even less concern about human rights violations occurring in Indonesia itself. When Indonesian troops killed scores of Muslim villagers in the province of Lampung in February 1989, for example, there was scarcely a murmur of protest from the international community.
In short, the counter-insurgency campaign in Aceh was set in motion at a time when the New Order leadership had reason to believe that the brutal methods it had used in East Timor, Irian Jaya, Java, Lampung and other "trouble spots" had worked. Under the circumstances, they undoubtedly felt confident that the same methods could be used to good effect, and without serious political cost, in Aceh as well. That confidence was bolstered by their judgement that the international community would exhibit little sympathy for the victims in Aceh, if they could be successfully portrayed as dangerous Muslim fanatics.
That assessment was not far wrong. Long after the Santa Cruz massacre had forced recognition of the seriousness of the problem in East Timor, and at least some sort of response from the New Order, the widespread violations of human rights in Aceh received scarcely a mention either abroad or within Indonesia. The silence within Indonesia was not surprising, because legitimate fears of military retribution inhibited both the gathering of accurate information and its public dissemination. The inaction of the international community, on the other hand, was inexcusable. Most western and Asian governments maintained a deliberate silence on the subject even though they had credible information about what was happening, both from their own embassy officials, and from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Among Asian governments, Prime Minister Mahathir's Malaysia was conspicuous for its hypocrisy. While berating Western governments for their failure to come to the aid of Muslims in Bosnia, Malaysian authorities returned dozens of Acehnese asylum seekers to Indonesia against their will, in violation of the internationally recognized principle of non-refoulement.74 The decision to maintain that unseemly silence, to conduct business as usual with the New Order, and to cooperate actively in the persecution of Acehnese, unquestionably helped to ensure that military operations, and human rights abuses, would continue in Aceh for nearly a decade.
By contrast, changes in the wider political context after May 1998 provide some grounds for optimism about Aceh's future. Notwithstanding the extreme reluctance of the Habibie government to take action, in late 1998 the domestic political climate was arguably more conducive to the investigation of human rights violations, and the punishment of those responsible, than at any time in the preceding three decades. The same was true of the international political climate, which appeared not only to support a shift toward democratization in Indonesia but also the punishment under international law of those responsible for egregious violations of human rights.75 The continuing economic crisis, moreover, left the Habibie regime vulnerable to, and dependent on, the demands of foreign creditors, and there was no indication in late 1998 that the latter favored a return to the corrupt authoritarian system which many blamed for the crisis. In any case, the avalanche of evidence of past wrong-doing by the military had left international actors with little choice but to support the process of 74 On the Acehnese asylum-seekers in Malaysia, see Amnesty International, Shock Therapy, pp. 53-56. 75 Among the most notable developments in this regard in 1998 were the agreement to establish an international criminal court, and the initiation by a Spanish magistrate of legal proceedings against General Pinochet of Chile for crimes against humanity. reform and democratization. Indeed, the United States and other governments appeared to have given notice that any overt move toward the reassertion of military control of political life would not be welcome. Such acts have continued in recent times. Shortly after General Wiranto announced that Aceh's status as a Military Operations Area would be lifted in August 1998, a number of highly provocative incidents occurred in rapid succession, including an Aceh Merdeka flag-raising at a school just days after the announcement, and a wild stone-throwing attack (in which nobody was injured) on a unit of departing Kopassus troops. The latter incident was later reported to have been staged by a Kopassustrained vigilante youth organization, Pemuda Keamanan Desa, and there was a general perception that at least some of the other incidents, too, had been orchestrated to justify a reversal of the announced plan to end the military operation. Similar allegations were made in connection with the violence that erupted in late 1998, though it was too early to say whether these allegations were true. Yet, whatever its root causes, the recent violence did serve to justify the redeployment of combat troops in the province, leading many Acehnese to the pessimistic conclusion that a second counter-insurgency campaign was set to begin.
Intra-military tensions
On the other hand certain developments after the demise of President Suharto in May 1998 made possible a cautious optimism about Aceh's future. While there was every likelihood that some officers would continue to seek a return to Aceh's status as a Military Operations Area, the dramatic decline nationwide in respect for and trust of the military, and the depth of public outrage over past human rights abuses, seemed likely to encourage the central command to resist that temptation. While such an act of restraint could not be expected to resolve immediately all outstanding problems, it would help to limit the chances for a dramatic re-escalation of violence. a proper vetting of military responsibility in Aceh. Moreover, the fate of Prabowo and many of his closest allies, and the precipitous decline in the prestige of Kopassus in 1998, may help to ensure that terrorist methods will no longer be regarded as career enhancing options, a change that could lead to a general decline in state violence in the coming years.
Profiles in terror
Conclusions
I began by asking why Aceh was so unsettled, so rawan, under the New Order, and whether it is destined to remain that way in the post-Suharto era. The broad answer to the first question is that the violent conflict in Aceh after 1989 was not the inevitable consequence of primordial Acehnese sentiments, nor a manifestation of a venerable Acehnese tradition of resistance to outside authority or Islamic rectitude. Instead, I have argued that it was the unintended, but largely inevitable, consequence of certain characteristic policies and practices of the New Order state itself. The argument is not that the culture and traditions of the people of Aceh were of no importance in stimulating demands for independence there, or in generating the conflict that followed. Rather, I have tried to show how the policies and practices of the New Order regime, and the unique historical circumstances which shaped them, gave these incipient demands a much wider credibility than they might otherwise have had, and also ensured a rapid escalation from resolvable political disagreement to widespread violence and political conflict.
Both the Aceh Merdeka rebellions and the violence that followed appeared to be integrally linked to the New Order's management of the exploitation of Aceh's natural resources and the distribution of economic benefits, especially as these policies developed after the discovery of oil and LNG in the 1970s. Driven by a highly centralized system of decision-making, by its close association with foreign capital, and by the opportunities for public and private revenue generation that these arrangements provided, the New Order's own economic policy in Aceh kindled support for Aceh Merdeka among a broad cross-section of the population in the late 1970s and 1980s. The regime's heightened efforts to ensure security in the area from the mid-1970s, largely through repressive means, paradoxically produced the opposite effect, generating still greater resentment and instability, and stimulating Aceh Merdeka's resurgence in 1989. Although Aceh Merdeka appeared to have been defeated militarily by the mid-1990s, the underlying economic and social grievances that made it popular had not been resolved by 1998. This was immediately evident when, with the fall of Suharto, Acehnese of diverse social backgrounds began to express their views openly again.
As fundamental and persistent as these grievances were in generating support for Aceh Merdeka, they did not appear to account for the unprecedented levels of violence that followed the movement's re-emergence in 1989 and persisted for nearly a decade thereafter. Aceh Merdeka was partly responsible for that development in the sense that its explicitly separatist objectives, bellicose language, resort to arms, and sense of timing seemed calculated to provoke a harsh government response. Nevertheless, the escalation and persistence of violence and instability after 1989, I have argued, was primarily the result of the specific doctrines and practices employed by the Indonesian armed forces in their efforts to quash the incipient rebellion-in particular the use of systematic terror and the forced mobilization of civilians as military auxiliaries.
In the short term, terror and "civil-military cooperation" worked rather well. By terrorizing the population, the military ensured that all but the most foolhardy would abandon the rebellion and remain silent about what they had witnessed. And by forcing the population to join in military and intelligence operations against members of their own communities, they divided those communities and effectively weakened the social base of the resistance. At the same time, however, Indonesian military policy and practice in Aceh produced a range of disastrous medium and long-term consequences. First, through the systematic use of terror, it generated levels of insecurity and political violence far greater than anything that ever was, or ever could have been, achieved by Aceh Merdeka itself. Second, by compelling civilians to participate in its intelligence and combat operations, it laid the foundation for bitter conflicts among Acehnese which surfaced in late 1998, and appeared likely to inhibit a return to peace. Third, by designating Aceh as a Military Operations Area for almost a decade, it may have fostered the emergence of a military mafia that could be expected to resist all efforts to change the status quo. Finally, by resorting to the use of provocation and terror against civilian populations, it stimulated a deep-seated anger among an ever-widening circle of Acehnese. As human rights activist Munir noted in August 1998, "The excesses committed during the military operation in Aceh have given birth to a seed of popular hatred toward the armed forces."89 That hatred, and the new cycle of violence it helped to generate in late 1998, were a depressing reminder that the legacy of the military strategy used in Aceh might survive long after its principal architect, Suharto, had left the scene. The failure of the Habibie government to address widespread concern about past military abuses, and its apparent inclination to pursue similar strategies in Aceh, further fueled popular anger and appeared likely to impede the prospects for peace.
The strategy and tactics employed in Aceh after 1990 were not the product of a rigid and unchanging Indonesian military doctrine. Rather they were shaped by the specific historical context within which both the rebellion and the response to it occurred. Three factors were especially important in facilitating the violence: an international and domestic political climate that together encouraged a sense of confidence and impunity among Indonesia's leaders in the use of terrorist methods; the existence of tensions within the Indonesian military, and in particular between the central command and local units deemed insufficiently loyal to the center; and finally, a pattern of domination of key military posts in Aceh by officers with close ties to the Palace and experience in counter-insurgency and intelligence.
To the extent that the methods used by the military in Aceh were shaped by unique historical conditions, it may be argued that changes in those conditions will alter the pattern of violence in the future. In this respect, a number of recent developments offer some grounds for optimism that Aceh, and other "trouble spots," may be spared a future of chronic violence. One potentially positive change, I have argued, is the decline in the power and prestige of Kopassus, and of other units speciali7ing in counter-insurgency and terror. Another is the dismissal of Prabowo, and the fact that the careers of many of the key figures responsible for military operations in Aceh have gone nowhere. Although they must be set against the Habibie government's strong disinclination to investigate and punish past abuses, these developments may nevertheless serve to weaken the propensity for the use of official violence in Aceh and elsewhere in the future.
Perhaps the greatest reason for optimism, however, lies in the remarkable changes in the domestic and international political climate that have come with the collapse of the New Order. Within a few months of the Suharto regime's demise the mysterious killings, the rapes, the mass graves, and a litany of other crimes committed by the armed forces in Aceh over almost a decade became the focus of wide-ranging public scrutiny and debate. Key members of the international community, so long complicit in hiding these and other New Order crimes, appeared ready to support moves toward genuine democratization. Notwithstanding serious doubts about the sincerity of the Habibie government's commitment to reform, these shifts appeared to offer a rare opportunity to pursue investigations into past military wrong-doing, to prosecute the authorities responsible, and thereby to break the cycle of impunity that had for so long encouraged abuses to continue.
An important implication of these recent developments, and of the historical evidence presented in this paper, is that continued conflict in Aceh, and perhaps in other "trouble spots" as well, is by no means inevitable. On the contrary, if I am right in locating the problem of instability and violence in the distinctive policies and practices of the late New Order state, and in the particular historical context within which they were played out, then a change in those policies and in that context could conceivably bring an end to the violence, and perhaps even to demands for independence. The evidence also suggests that national disintegration will not be the automatic result of an end to authoritarian rule in Indonesia. In fact, I think it can be argued that, far from jeopardizing the political future of the country, a shift toward a less authoritarian political system-and one which is less wedded to the use of terrormay provide the best possible guarantee of its continued unity and viability.
